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CONTRACT LAW, DEFAULT RULES, AND THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF PROMISING. 
Richard Craswell* 
Among the topics addressed by moral philosophy is the obligation 
to keep one's promises. To many philosophers, there is something 
strange (or, at least, something calling for explanatie1n) in the idea that 
moral obligations can be created simply by an individual's saying so -
yet this is what seems to happen when a person makes a promise. 
Consequently, there is by now a large body of literature attempting to 
identify the exact source and nature of this moral obligation. 
Contract law, too, has something to do with promises, so philoso-
phers oflaw (and philosophically minded lawyers) often draw on phil-
osophical theories about promising when writing about contract law. 
For example, a recent book by Charles Fried purports "to show how a 
complex legal institution, contract, can be traced to and is determined 
by a small number of basic moral principles .... " 1 In Fried's view, a 
recognition of the proper philosophical basis of contract law leads to 
conclusions profoundly different from those that would result from 
any attempt to rest contract law on other social policies, such as eco-
nomic efficiency or the redistribution of wealth. 2 
My thesis is that such claims on behalf of philosophical theories of 
promising are greatly exaggerated. . In particular, analyses such as 
Fried's have little or no relevance to those parts of contract law that 
govern the proper remedies for breach, the conditions under which the 
promiser is excused from her duty to perform, or the additional obli-
gations (such as implied warranties) imputed to the promiser as an 
implicit part of her promise. These doctrines, which serve. to define 
the exact scope of contractual obligations, are often referred to as 
* Professor of Law, University of Southern California. B.A. 1974, Michigan State Univer-
sity; J.D. 1977, University of Chicago. - Ed. I have benefited from comments by Scott Altman, 
Ian Ayres, Randy E. Barnett, Richard A. Epstein, John Finnis, John Gardner, Ronald R. Garet, 
Catharine W. Hantzis, Michael S. Moore, Joseph Raz, Alan Schwartz, W. David Slawson, Chris-
topher D. Stone, and participants in workshops at USC and at Oxford University. I am also 
grateful for financial support from the USC Law Center Summer Research Fund and the USC-
Oxford Legal Theory Institute. 
1. C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981), 
at the first (unnumbered) page of the preface. See also Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the 
Reemergence of Legal Philosophy (Book Review), 97 HARV. L. REV. 1223 (1984) (applauding 
what he sees as the growing recognition of the importance of normative philosophy to contract 
law and to legal scholarship generally). 
2. C. FRIED, supra note l, at 4-6, 74-85, 103-11. 
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"background rules" or "default rules," although the term "default 
rules" more commonly refers only to those rules which the parties are 
free to vary by appropriate language in their contract. 3 As not all 
contract rules can be varied in this way, I will use the term "back-
ground rules" to refer to both waivable and nonwaivable rules. 
I am not asserting here that philosophical theories about promising 
can have no implications for any part of contract law. Such theories 
may well have implications for questions about the proper scope of 
freedom of contract - that is, questions about whether any given rule 
ought to be merely a default rule, or whether it ought to be mandatory 
for all parties. In addition, certain philosophical theories may have 
implications for the proper content of contract law's background rules. 
For example, theories that justify the enforceability of promises on 
grounds of economic efficiency, or on the special value of certain kinds 
of relationships, may imply that the law should adopt those back-
ground rules that are most efficient or that best promote the most 
highly valued kinds of relationships. 
Other philosophical theories, however - including the one en- . 
dorsed by Fried - have no such implications for the content of the 
law's background rules. These theories ground the enforceability of 
promises on considerations of individual freedom and autonomy, or 
on the principle of fidelity to one's prior statements or commitments. 
In a nutshell, the fidelity principle is consistent with any set of back-
ground rules because those rules merely fill out the details of what it is 
a person has to remain faithful to, or what a person's prior commit-
ment is deemed to be. Thus, while fidelity may dictate that a promisor 
must live up to the obligations described by any set of background 
rules the law has adopted, it cannot guide the legal system in deciding 
which background rules to adopt in the first place. The principle of 
individual freedom is equally unhelpful, for it implies only that indi-
viduals should be left free to change whatever default rule the law 
adopts as a starting point. Once again, some other value must be in-
voked to explain why one starting point ought to be picked by the law 
in preference to another. 
If I am right, this means that it is not enough to reject notions such 
as economic efficiency, or theories that value certain kinds of relation-
ships more highly than others, as insufficient or incorrect justifications 
for the basic proposition that promises ought to be enforced. Even if 
3. The role of "default rules" is discussed at more length in Goetz & Scott, The Limits of 
Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 
73 CALIF. L. REV. 261 (1985), and Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: A11 
Eco11omic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). 
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those theories are rejected at this most basic level, further argriment is 
needed to explain why they are inadmissible bases for selecting the 
law's background rules or starting points, and, if so, to explain what 
other values ought to be used instead. Unfortunately, current writings 
bringing philosophical analysis to bear on contract law have focused 
almost entirely on the more basic question of why promises ought to 
be enforced at all, and have tended to overlook this second level of 
analysis. This frequently leads to careless or ad hoc statements con-
cerning the proper content of contract law's background rules. 
Part I of this article presents a more detailed survey of recent phil-
osophical writings about promises, for the benefit of legal readers who 
may be unfamiliar with that literature. Part II then discusses the role 
of background rules in contract law, and shows why the content of 
those rules cannot be derived from philosophical theories based on in-
dividual liberty, or on ideals such as fidelity or truthfulness. Finally, 
Part III examines the writings of Charles Fried and Randy Barnett to 
illustrate the consequences of attempting to apply philosophy to con-
tract law without addressing these problems. These two authors have 
supplied the most comprehensive attempts to give contract law a phil-
osophical grounding, yet each falls into exactly this error. 
I. PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES ABOUT PROMISING 
Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of questions that can be 
asked about the ethics of promising. One category consists of ques-
tions that might be asked by someone wondering whether to make a 
promise - for example, "Should I promise to donate money to the 
poor?" or "Should I promise to help a friend, if I can do so at little 
inconvenience to myself!" The other consists of questions facing 
someone who has already made a promise - for example, "Should I 
carry out my promise, even though my circumstances or my desires 
have changed?" The first class of questions asks what kinds of 
promises ought to be made, while the second asks what follows from 
having made a promise. 
The first class of questions has received little attent!on in philo-
sophical writings about promising as such. This should not be surpris-
ing, for the ethical theories most relevant to questions about what kind 
of promises to make will usually be theories with implications far be-
yond the topic of promising. If a person is wondering whether to 
promise money to the poor, the· most interesting question (from the 
standpoint of ethics) is whether she ought to help the poor at all. The 
subsidiary question of whether she ought to help them by promising 
money, rather than giving them money without ever having first 
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promised to do so, seems much less important. Thus, ethical theories 
about what kind of promises to make usually derive from theories 
about the particular subject matter of the promise (helping the poor, 
etc.). They do not derive from theories about promising as such. 
The same could be true of the second class of questions, concern-
ing the ethical consequences of having made a promise. That is, there 
would be nothing illogical in believing that the conditions under which 
it is excusable to break a promise to the poor have no connection (in 
the sense of being linked by any common theory) with the conditions 
under which it is excusable to break a business promise, or a promise 
to a friend. If that were the case, there would be no point in asking 
questions about the nature of the commitment represented by 
promises in general. One could speak of the commitment represented 
by charitable promises, or business promises, but it would be useless to 
search for any general, unifying theory of promises. 
Most people, though, would reject the idea that the obligations im-
posed by different kinds of promises have nothing in common. The 
mere fact that we classify certain speech acts as "promises''. strongly 
suggests that they have something in common; otherwise, there would 
be no point to that classification. Indeed, there is a growing body of 
philosophical literature which attempts to describe the obligation 
someone accepts when she promises to do some action¢, regardless of 
how ¢ is filled in. That literature presupposes that there are at least 
some things that can be said about promises without discussing the 
specific subject matter of the promise. 
Contract law, too, is traditionally concerned with the elements that 
all promises have in common, so it is this literature that is most often 
invoked by legal scholars in search of a philosophical grounding for 
contract law. The remainder of this Part describes this literature in 
more· detail. One branch of the literature takes it as given that 
promises are morally binding and attempts to describe the exact way 
in which this "bindingness" should constrain the promisor's subse-
quent conduct. Another branch attempts to articulate the reasons 
why promises might be morally binding. While these two inquiries are 
related at many points, it will be convenient to discuss them 
separately. 
A. What Does It Mean To Be Bound by a Promise? 
Assume that a person has promised to do some action ¢. Most 
people would agree that this does not place the promisor under an 
absolute duty to do ¢ - for example, if¢ becomes impossible for rea-
sons beyond the promisor's control, she may be excused from her obli-
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gation.4 Most people would also agree that the promisor's freedom 
has been constrained in some way, so she cannot decide whether or 
not to do ¢ with the same freedom she would have had if she had not 
made the promise. If asked to articulate the exact way in which her 
freedom is constrained, however, most people would have a great deal 
of difficulty. 
Philosophers have taken two somewhat different approaches to ar-
ticulating the way in which a promise constrains the promisor. One 
approach views the promise as creating additional reasons in favor of 
doing ¢; the other views the promise as barring the promisor from 
considering certain reasons that might otherwise argue against doing 
¢. Each of these will be discussed below. 
1. Promises as Excluding Reasons for Action 
One view of the way that promises constrain a promisor's subse-
quent deliberations can be found in a 1955 article by John Rawls.5 
Rawls was only indirectly concerned with promises, as his main objec-
tive was to describe the distinction between justifying a social practice 
and justifying an individual action within such a practice. But because 
Rawls found the practice of promising to be a useful example, much of 
what he said is relevant here. 
Rawls' point was that some practices, including promising, are de-
fined so as to make certain arguments no longer available to those 
acting within the practice. More specifically, once a person has prom-
ised to do something, it is no longer open to that person to decide not 
to perform on the ground that, all things considered, nonperformance 
seems preferable to performance. 6 While such a preference might be a 
perfectly proper ground on which to refuse to make a promise in the 
first place, the rules of promising foreclose such an argument once the 
promise has been· made. 
Rawls recognized that this did not mean that a promisor was 
obliged to carry out her promise regardless of the circumstances: 
Is this to say that in particular cases one cannot deliberate whether or 
not to keep one's promise? Of course not. But to do so is to deliberate 
whether the various excuses, ex".eptions and defenses, which are under-
stood by, and which constitute an important part of, the practice, apply 
to one's own case. Various defenses for not keeping one's promise are 
allowed, but among them there isn't the one that, on general utilitarian 
grounds, the promisor (truly) thought his action best on the whole, even 
4. For convenience in the use of pronouns, all my examples will assume a female promisor 
and a male promisee. 
5. Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. R.Ev. 3 (1955). 
6. Id. at 16-17. 
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though there may be the defense that the consequences of keeping one's 
promise would have been extremely severe. 7 
Rawls argued that the practice of promising must rule out an excuse 
based on a general balance of considerations - otherwise, the point of 
having the practice would be lost. 
More recently, Joseph Raz has developed a similar theory in which 
promises supply what he calls "exclusionary reasons."8 According to 
Raz, a promise to do¢ constrains the promisor's options by preventing 
her from giving any weight to certain arguments that might be rele-
vant if she had not promised. In other words, promises are not them-
selves reasons for doing ¢, but they bar or exclude certain factors 
which might otherwise be reasons not to do ¢. 
Like Rawls, Raz recognizes that promises do not exclude all other 
considerations, thereby leaving the promisor under an absolute obliga-
. tion to do ¢. If¢ would involve actions that were themselves immoral, 
for example, it might still be permissible for the promisor to choose 
not to do ¢. 9 Indeed, Raz does not attempt to list the precise reasons 
that are excluded by a promise - though he would at least agree with 
Rawls that the reason, "all things considered, it seems best not to¢" is 
one of the excluded reasons. 10 A promise binds a promisor, in Raz's 
view, by excluding such arguments from the promisor's subsequent 
calculations. 
2. Promises as New Reasons for Action 
A different class of theories holds that a promise creates new rea-
sons to perform the promised action, which must then be added to any 
pre-existing balance of reasons for and against the action. For exam-
ple, a promise may give rise to expectations in the promisee, and the 
fact that nonperformance would disappoint those expectations may 
count as a reason favoring performance. 11 If the promisee has relied 
on the promise in any way, so that nonperformance would leave him 
worse off than if the promise had never been made, this might provide 
7. Id. (footnote omitted). 
8. See especially Raz, Promises and Obligations, in LA w, MORALITY AND SOCIETY 210, 222 
(P. Hacker & J. Raz eds. 1977). For more general discussions of the concept of "exclusionary 
reasons" (or "pre·emptive reasons," as he refers to them in his later work), see J. RAZ, THE 
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 42-69 (1986); J. RAz, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS ch. 1 (1975); 
Raz, Authority and Consent, 67 VA. L. REV. 103 (1981). 
9. Raz, Promises and Obligations, supra note 8, at 21 I. 
10. Id. at 222-23. 
I I. For examples of this theory, see Arda!, And That's a Promise, 18 PHIL. Q. 225, 233-37 
(1968); Narveson, Promising, Expecting, and Utility, 1 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 207, 213-20 (1971). 
See also Downie, Three Accounts of Promising, 35 PHIL. Q. 259, 263-64 (1985) (attributing this 
argument to Adam Smith). 
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an even stronger reason in favor of performing the promise.12 
As in the case of the theories discussed in the preceding subsection, 
these theories do not imply that a promisor must always carry out the 
promise. While the fact that the promisee would be disappointed may 
be a reason in favor of doing ¢, nothing in this theory rules out the 
possibility of there being other, stronger reasons against ¢. If ¢ is an 
immoral action, or has become impossible, the reasons against doing ¢ 
might well outweigh the reasons in favor of doing ¢. Thus, both sets 
of theories are consistent with the belief that a promise is not binding 
in all circumstances. 
Similarly, both sets of theories are consistent with the belief that a 
promise somehow militates in favor of performance, in the sense of 
requiring the promisor to choose ¢ in at least some cases where, absent 
the promise, she would otherwise have chosen not to do so. The first 
set of theories explains such cases by saying that the promise excludes 
certain reasons that might otherwise have counseled against doing ¢, 
so the promise will have a decisive effect in any case where those ex-
cluded reasons would otherwise have been dispositive. The second set 
explains the promisor's decision by saying that all the old reasons for 
and against ¢ remain relevant, but the promise creates new reasons in 
favor of¢. On this view, the promise will make a difference whenever 
the balance of old reasons would have counseled against ¢, but the 
addition of the new reasons is enough to tip that balance in favor of¢. 
Finally, neither of these theories attempts to explain why a prom-
isor is morally bound to limit her subsequent behavior in the way pos-
tulated by the theory. Instead, the goal of these theories is simply to 
illuminate the ordinary understanding of what it means to be under a 
promissory obligation, by explaining precisely what it is that a prom-
isor is thought to be bound to do. The question of whether (or why) 
anyone is morally obliged to follow that ordinary understanding is a 
separate question which requires a separate analysis. Accordingly, the 
following section surveys some recent philosophical theories addressed 
to the question of why the rules of promising are or ought to be mor-
ally binding. 
B. Why Should Anyone Obey the Rules of Promising? 
The question of why the rules of promising are morally binding is 
easily confused with the question addressed in the preceding section, 
12. Theorists who focus on the promisee's reliance, rather than the bare expectation of per-
formance, include MacCormick, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers, 46 ARISTOTE-
LIAN SocY. 59, 62-63 (Supp. Vol. 1972), and Hanfling, Promises, Games and Institutions, 75 
PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOCY. 13, 15-18 (1975). 
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concerning exactly what it is that the rules of promising require. Some 
of this confusion was unintentionally introduced by a 1964 article by 
John Searle, provocatively entitled How to Derive "Ought" from 
''Is. " 13 Searle's point was that certain kinds of descriptive assertions, 
or "is" statements, are statements describing "institutional facts." For 
example, the statement that someone has hit a home run - as distinct 
from the statement that someone has hit a round object over a fence 
with a piece of wood - makes sense only within the institutional 
framework created by the rules of baseball. 14 Similarly (in Searle's 
view), the statement that someone has made a promise makes sense 
only within the framework created by the rules of promising. Thus, to 
say that a person has promised is to describe that person with refer-
ence to the rules of promising, and those rules include the normative 
or "ought" statement that people who promise are bound to act differ-
ently in some way as a result of their promise. 15 In this sense, Searle 
argued, it is possible to move from certain kinds of "is" statements to 
certain kinds of "oughts." 
A number of writers responded by pointing out that this argument, 
standing alone, does not really show that anyone who promises ought 
therefore to accept the rules of the practice of promising, or ought to 
regard those rules as morally binding. 16 As Searle later clarified, the 
only kind of "ought" that he was discussing was one that was internal 
to the practice of promising.17 It would still be open for someone to 
reject the entire practice of promising, or to argue that some or all of 
that practice's rules were unjust. Searle's derivation of "ought" from 
"is" was never intended to supply the answer to this kind of "ought" 
question. 
In consequence, writers have had to look elsewhere for the source 
of the moral obligation to respect the rules of promising. Here, too, 
the various explanations can be grouped into two categories, which 
correspond in some ways to the two theories discussed in the preced-
ing section concerning what the rules of promising actually require. 
Some writers have argued that the obligations created by a promise 
can only be explained by positing that individual promisors possess 
13. 73 PHIL. REV. 43 (1964). 
14. Id. at 54-55. 
15. Id. at 55-56. 
16. See, e.g., Carey, How to Confuse Commitment with Obligation, 72 J. PHIL. 276 (1975); 
Hare, The Promising Game, 70 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE 398 (1964); Jones, 
Making and Keeping Promises, 76 ETHICS 287 (1966); Miller, Constitutive Rules and Essential 
Ru/es, 39 PHIL. STUD. 183 (1981); Robins, The Primacy of Promising, 85 MIND 321, 329-30 
(1976). 
17. J. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS 188-89 (1969). 
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"norm-creating powers," under which they are authorized to create 
new moral obligations merely by agreeing to do so. Others have ar-
gued that no such powers are necessary, and that the moral obligation 
to keep a promise is merely a particular instance of a more general 
obligation, such as the obligation not to cause harm to others or the 
obligation to tell the truth. Each theory will be discussed below. 
1. Promises and Norm-Creating Powers 
Joseph Raz has offered the most complete defense of the position 
that the moral obligation to respect the rules of promising must rest on 
some norm-creating power possessed by the promisor. 18 Without be-
ing quite as explicit, and without necessarily agreeing with other as-
pects of Raz's theory, other writers have taken an essentially similar 
position. For example, Charles Fried has argued that notions of indi-
vidual freedom and autonomy require that individuals be allowed to 
bind themselves by promising. 19 Economists have pointed to the so-
cial utility of allowing individuals to bind themselves to a future 
course of conduct, to make it easier for others to arrange their lives in 
reliance on the promise.20 In Raz's terms, all of these are arguments 
that individuals ought to have at least one norm-creating power: the 
power to create a moral obligation by making a promise. 
' In a somewhat similar vein, Randy Barnett has argued that 
promises are best viewed as marking the promiser's consent to the 
transfer of part of her bundle of property rights.21 "Property rights" 
are meant here in the broadest possible sense; they thus include future 
rights such as "the right to fifty bushels of wheat on August 1," or 
even disjunctive rights such as "the right to fifty bushels of wheat or 
their equivalent in money." On this view, if a seller has consented to 
transfer to a buyer the right to "fifty bushels of wheat on August l," 
the seller no longer has any right to control those bushels when Au-
gust 1 arrives, so her retention of those bushels would constitute the 
taking of another's property. Barnett's account of promising might 
seem more parsimonious than Raz's, as Barnett grounds the force of a 
promise in an already recognized power - the power to transfer prop-
18. Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers, 46 ARISTOTELIAN SocY. 79 (Supp. 
Vol. 1972). For a somewhat similar position, see Robins, supra note 16. 
19. C. FRIED, supra note l, at 14-17. 
20. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 
YALE L.J. 1261 (1980). 
21. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986). As Barnett 
notes, this view of contract law dates back at least as far as Blackstone's Commentaries. Id. at 
292 n.98;seea/so P. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 179 (1981) (attributing this view of 
promising to Hobbes). 
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erty - rather than having to posit a separate normative power for 
promising. Notice, though, that the power to transfer title to property 
is itself an instance of what Raz would term a norm-creating power. 
In this sense, Barnett's theory is merely a particular example of the 
kind of theory that Raz believes necessary to account for the moral 
force of the rules of promising. 22 
Of course, positing a norm-creating power of this sort merely 
pushes the normative question back one step: What justifies the exist-
ence of this norm-creating power? To this question, many different 
answers can be and have been given. Economists usually rely on utili-
tarian justifications, arguing that a rule letting people make enforcea-
ble promises is likely (under certain conditions) to lead to the best use 
of resources. As noted above, Fried justifies the power to bind oneself 
as a corollary of respect for autonomy and individual freedom. Raz 
tentatively suggests a somewhat different answer: since promises cre-
ate a special relationship between the promisor and promisee, the 
power to create such relationships is morally justified only if those re-
lationships are themselves desirable.23 
I will argue below that, when it comes to deriving legal implica-
tions, it may well make a difference which argument is used to justify 
these norm-creating powers. 24 In the philosophical literature on 
promising, though, these differences are less important (and receive 
less discussion) because all of these arguments lead to the same conclu-
sion: that individuals ought to have the norm-creating power repre-
sented by promising. Thus, all of these theorists find themselves on 
one side of a divide, with the other side occupied by the theorists to be 
discussed in the next two sections. 
2. Promises and Harm to Others 
A different approach to explaining the moral force of the rules of 
promising begins with the observation that breaking a promise will 
22. Raz occasionally distinguishes between consenting and promising, but his examples sug-
gest that he is simply using "consent" in a sense that is narrower than Barnett's usage. For 
example, Raz argues that one can consent to give someone a right to some action, but cannot 
consent to give someone a mere right of recipience, such as the right to be paid a sum of money. 
Raz, Authority and Consent, supra note 8, at 121-22. Thus, where Barnett would say that a 
tenant has consented to transfer to her landlord the right to $1000 per month for each of the next 
12 months, Raz would simply say that the tenant has promised to pay that sum. As nearly as I 
can tell, nothing turns on this difference in usage. 
23. Raz, Promises and Obligations, supra note 8, at 227-28. In another context (while dis-
cussing consent generally), Raz has also noted the traditional instrumental arguments that letting 
people make their own promises is likely to lead to the best use of resources, or that promises 
develop peoples' characters and train them in such useful virtues as cooperation and careful 
planning. Raz, Authority and Consent, supra note 8, at 123-25. 
24. See infra notes 48-57 and accompanying text. 
December 1989] The Philosophy of Promising 499 
often harm the promisee, especially if he has relied on the promise in 
any way. If there is a general principle that one ought not cause harm 
to others, that might be enough to justify some sort of rule against 
promise-breaking, at least when breaking the promise would in fact 
cause harm. In particular, this justification would fit well with the 
view that the only obligation imposed by a promise is an obligation to 
take this harm into account, as one reason - not necessarily the only 
one, or even a dispositive one - in favor of performing the promised 
action.25 
Most people, though, are unwilling to equate a general obligation 
not to harm others with the specific obligation imposed by a promise. 
Imagine, for example, that a complete stranger walks up to you and 
says that he· has formed the belief that you are about to give him 
$50,000 - and, moreover, that he has relied on this expectation by 
incurring various debts and obligations, none of which he would have 
incurred had he not believed that you were about to give him the 
money. The stranger's predicament in this case might provide a slight 
reason for you to help him out by giving him the $50,000 - after all, 
helping a fellow citizen is almost always a good reason for action -
but it will not be a very strong one. Moreover, none of the writers 
cited above would say that preventing harm to the stranger is as strong 
a reason for action in this case as it would be if you had promised to 
give him $50,000, and your promise was what led him to incur his 
additional debts. Thus, some further argument is necessary to explain 
the particular force of the reason for action that is generated once a 
promise has been made. 26 
Some writers have tried to explain the additional force generateg 
by a promise by pointing to the fact that a person who makes a prom-
ise has thereby caused the rise in the other party's expectations, and 
has likewise been a cause of the other party's reliance on the prom-
ise. 27 By contrast, the example in the preceding paragraph involved 
expectations and reliance which could not be causally attributed to 
any action of the person charged with the obligation. Thus, these 
writers rest the moral force of promissory obligations on a narrower 
form of the harm principle. While there is no obligation, or at best a 
very weak obligation, to take steps to prevent harm to others (these 
25. See supra note 12. 
26. For other criticisms of the bare-reliance argument, using examples similar to the one in 
the text, see C. FRIED, supra note 1, at 10-11; Raz, Promises in Morality and Law (Book Review), 
95 HARV. L. REV. 916, 924-25 (1982). 
27. E.g., MacCormick, supra note 12, at 66-67. 
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writers would say), there is a much stronger obligation not actively to 
cause that harm. 
Even this principle may be too broad, however. As a number of 
writers have pointed out, it is easy to imagine cases where one person 
has caused another to rely in some way, but the resulting obligation 
does not seem as strong as if the first person had made a promise to the 
second. Raz suggests the example of someone who informs a friend 
that she will almost certainly be able to offer the friend a ride into 
town, and that the likelihood of her being able to do so is sufficiently 
high that it makes perfect sense for the friend to rely on her rather 
than making alternative arrangements - but who warns, "remember 
- I do not promise anything, I am merely advising you. "28 In such a 
case, the friend presumably would be perfectly justified in relying on 
the statement by forgoing any alternative arrangements. The friend's 
lack of alternative arrangements may even be a factor that the speaker 
ought to consider in subsequently deciding whether to change her 
plans in some way that would prevent her from offering the ride. 
However, the force of this reason for going through with the offered 
ride still does not seem as strong as if the speaker had offered the ride 
and said, "I promise I'll be there." Thus, a promise still seems to add 
something to the force of the reasons for action over and above the 
force that can be attributed to the principle of not causing harm to 
others. 
A closely related objection notes that the notion of "cause" em-
ployed in this argument is more than a little problematic.29 Reliance 
on a promise is always caused (in a "but for" sense) by the promisee as 
well as by the promisor, for it is the promisee who chooses to rely. 
Thus, some further argument is needed to explain why we quickly at-
tribute moral responsibility for another person's reliance to someone 
who has promised a particular action, but are less quick to attribute as 
much responsibility to someone who has made clear that she is not 
promising anything. To say that the person who relies assumes the 
risk of being disappointed if the other person's statement falls short of 
being a promise, but does not assume that risk if the other person has 
made an actual promise, is no answer. Such a response simply posits a 
difference in the extent of the speaker's responsibility in each case, 
when it is precisely that difference that needs a moral justification.30 
28. Raz, supra note 18, at 99. 
29. For an exceptionally clear statement of this objection, see P. ATIYAH, supra note 21, at 
63-69; see also G. WARNOCK, THE OBJECT OF MORALITY 98-100 (1971); Robins, supra note 16. 
30. Occasionally, the objection discussed in this paragraph is made by asserting that we can· 
not determine whether the promisee's reliance is reasonable without knowing whether the prom· 
ise is binding on the promisor. E.g., Barnett, supra note 21, at 275. However, Raz's example of 
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Patrick Atiyah suggested that the greater responsibility of a prom-
isor might be explained by treating the promise as a conqlusive admis-
sion that responsibility properly rested on the promisor. That is, 
Atiyah viewed the allocation of responsibility for the promisee's reli-
ance as a question of social policy, which would normally have to be 
settled by a court or legislature or other lawmaking institution.31 He 
then suggested that if an individual promisor admits that she should 
be responsible for the other party's reliance, by making an explicit 
promise, that sort of admission against interest should usually be 
treated as conclusively settling the social policy issue.n Notice, 
though, that this argument grants to individual promisors exactly the 
sort of norm-creating power for which Joseph Raz has argued.33 If 
individual promisors have the sovereign-like authority to determine 
conclusively who should bear responsibility for certain losses, they are 
exercising a power whose existence must be justified by some principle 
beyond the general notion of not causing harm to others. 
3. Promises and Misrepresentation 
The attempt to explain why a speaker's responsibility seems 
greater if she has made a definite promise - even if the harm to the 
other party is no greater than in an otherwise similar case where no 
promise has been made - is one of the factors that led many writers 
to posit a separate, norm-creating power which individuals can exer-
cise by making a promise. Other writers, however, have responded by 
narrowing the harm principle still further, saying that there is a partic-
ularly strong obligation not to cause harm to others by making false 
statements. Alternatively, the "harm" element can be eliminated en-
tirely, if there is an obligation not to misrepresent the truth regardless 
of whether the misrepresentation causes any actual harm. Under 
either of these views, which I will refer to collectively as the "misrep-
resentation theory," the key fact is not that breaking a promise causes 
harm, but that breaking a promise violates the obligation to tell the 
truth.34 
one friend informing another of a possible ride into town is enough to refute this proposition, by 
showing that there can be cases where it is reasonable for the promisee to rely regardless of 
whether the promise is binding. For further discussions of this issue, see McNeilly, Promises De-
moralized, 81 PHIL. REV. 63 (1971); Narveson, supra note 11. Assertions such as Barnett's are 
probably better interpreted as making the argument discussed in the text: that we cannot know 
whether it is reasonable to attribute responsibility for the reliance to the promisor without first 
deciding whether the promise is binding. 
31. P. ATIYAH, supra note 21, at 68-69. 
32. Id. at 184-202. 
33. Raz, supra note 26, at 926-27. 
34. For examples of this approach, see G. WARNOCK, supra note 29, at 101-11; Arda!, Ought 
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The misrepresentation theory reaches this conclusion by interpret-
ing all promises as representations about the promisor's future con-
duct. A person who promises to give a friend a ride has made a 
definite statement about what will happen in the future. If she then 
fails to come through with the ride, her failure makes this statement 
about the future a false one, thereby violating the obligation to tell the 
truth (in addition to causing harm). By contrast, a person who says 
that she will probably give her friend a ride, but who reserves the right 
to change her mind, has made a much weaker probabilistic statement 
about the future. That person's failure to perform would not make her 
previous statement false, and therefore would not violate the obliga-
tion to tell the truth, even though it might cause the same amount of 
harm to her friend. According to the misrepresentation theory, this is 
why a person who promises to give her friend a ride has a stronger 
reason to do so than does a person who has merely said that she is 
likely to give her friend a ride, without actually promising. · 
Admittedly, the obligation to tell the truth appears here in what 
may be an unfamiliar guise. The obligation has some elements of strict 
liability, for it is no defense to say that at the time of promising the 
speaker thought that her statement would come true. 35 In addition, 
the obligation to tell the truth is perhaps more usually thought of as an 
obligation limiting what one is allowed to say, by obliging people not 
to say anything that is false. Under this theory, though, the obligation 
limits what speakers can do, by forbidding people from doing anything 
that will make their prior statements turn out to be false. Rather than 
requiring people to conform their statements to reality, the misrepre-
sentation theory of promising requires people to act in such a way that 
reality will conform to their prior statements. 36 
In some respects, then, the misrepresentation theory is not that 
different from theories based on the notion of norm-creating powers, 
as discussed above. If the obligation to tell the truth means that an 
individual, by choosing to making a definite statement about the fu-
ture, can thereby place herself under an obligation to make sure that 
her statement comes true, then that individual certainly has the power 
to create an obligation of some sort. This obligation need not be of the 
sort discussed above ih section I.A.1, however, which obliged the 
We To Keep Contracts Because They Are Promises?, 11 VAL. U. L. REV. 655 (1983); Ardal, supra 
note 11, at 225; Fogelin, Richard Price on Promising: A Limited Defense, 21 J. HIST. PHIL. 289 
(1983); Hanfling, supra note 12, at 24-25. 
35. Compare the position of Charles Fried, discussed infra at note 68. 
36. For a more extended discussion of this aspect of the theory, see Fogelin, supra note 34, at 
296-97. 
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speaker not to consider certain reasons which might otherwise counsel 
against doing the promised act. The misrepresentation theory is 
equally consistent with obligations of the sort described in section 
I.A.2, which merely add the value of telling the truth as an additional 
reason in favor of performi~g the promised action. 
II. THE NEEDS OF CONTRACT LAW 
The rules of contract law can be divided into two categories: 
"background rules" and ~·agreement rules." As discussed earlier, 
background rules define the exact substance of a party's obligation, by 
specifying (among other things) the conditions under which her non-
performance will be excused, and the sanctions which will be applied 
to any unexcused nonperformance. By contrast, agreement rules spec-
ify the conditions and procedures the parties must satisfy in order to 
change an otherwise applicable background rule. Agreement rules 
thus include most of the rules governing offer and acceptance, as well 
as such doctrines as fraud or undue influence, which define the condi-
tions necessary for a party's apparent consent to be counted as truly 
valid.37 To be sure, these two categories are not mutually exclusive, 
for some rules serve both functions simultaneously. For example, the 
"mailbox rule" defines a procedure by which parties can agree to a 
contract changing any otherwise applicable background rule. It also 
provides a background rule of its own, by providing that the offeror's 
power to retract her offer ends as soon as an acceptance is posted (un-
less the offer itself provided otherwise). Notwithstanding such in-
stances of overlap, the distinction between background rules and 
agreement rules is still useful in understanding the relationship be-
tween the philosophical theories of promising and the content of con-
tract law. 
The philosophical theories discussed above may well have some 
relevance for contract law's agreement rules. For example, theories 
that ground the enforceability of promises on individual liberty might 
argue that the parties should be allowed to overturn nearly all of con-
tract law's background rules by an appropriate agreement, thereby af-
fording a much wider scope for the operation of whatever agreement 
rules the law adopts. Different philosophical theories might even have 
different implications for the content of those agreement rules - for 
example, the degree of force needed to make an individual's consent 
no longer voluntary, or the amount of information needed to make an 
37. If the law does not permit a particular background rule to be varied by the parties, then 
the set of "agreement rules" available to change that background is of course the null set. For a 
slightly different classification of contract rules, see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3. 
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individual's consent sufficiently informed. In this article, I am not 
concerned with the content of contract law's agreement rules, so I will 
not explore these implications further. 
It is less clear that the philosophical literature discussed above has 
any implications. for the content of contract law's background rules. 
All of the authors discussed above recognize that any real system of 
promising would have to include some set of rules governing excuses, 
remedies, and other details of the promisor's obligation. 38 Their pur-
pose, however, was to analyze the practice of promising at a higher 
level of abstraction. They were interested in the elements all promises 
had in common, regardless of the action ¢ that was promised, and 
largely regardless of the background rules governing such topics as 
remedies or excuses. Granted, a sufficiently extreme background rule 
- e.g., one excusing nonperformance whenever the promisor no 
longer felt like performing - might deprive a so-called "promise" of 
any binding force at all, thereby eliminating the very aspect of promis-
ing that interested these philosophers, and excluding the practice gov-
erned by such a rule from the scope of their analysis. Within those 
limits, though, the rules governing such topics as remedies and excuses 
could effectively be treated as just a more complete definition of the 
exact obligation undertaken by the promisor - in other words, as just 
another aspect of ¢. The goal of the writings described above was to 
explain how and why a promisor could be bound to live up to any ¢, 
regardless of exactly what that particular ¢ required. 
This indifference to the content of ¢ should not be taken to mean 
that these authors beiieved that the appropriate background rules 
could be determined simply by looking to the explicit content of a 
party's promise. At a minimum, the parties' specifications would be 
relevant only if the rule were one the parties were free to vary - a 
"default rule" in the terminology I have used here. Not all of the 
writers discussed above are willing to grant the parties that much 
power over every aspect of their obligation. 39 
Even when a background rule concerns a topic that everyone 
agrees the parties should be allowed to vary - say, the extent of the 
· warranty in the sale of a used automobile by a private individual -
many parties simply will not address that topic in their agreement, so 
there will be nothing in the agreement's explicit content to resolve this 
issue. As a result, some method must be found to interpret the parties' 
agreement, to provide rules governing any topic not explicitly settled 
38. See, for example, the passage from Rawls quoted in the text supra at note 7. 
39. See, e.g., Raz, supra note 26, at 932. 
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by the parties. Indeed, creative interpretation is often needed to deter-
mine whether there has been any binding promise at all, for even this 
fundamental question is not always explicitly settled by. the parties.4? 
While it is perhaps more common to speak of "interpretation" in cases 
where parties attempt to resolve an issue but do so with insufficient 
clarity, and to speak of applying default rules in cases where the par-
ties made no attempt to address an issue, the principle is much the 
same in either case.41 Both require an outside agency, such as a court, 
to choose the exact rules defining the parties' obligations where the 
parties have not unmistakably chosen some rule of their own. 
A. Possible Sources of Law 
The philosophical literature discussed above does not address these 
issues of interpretation and appropriate default rules. As that litera-
ture is concerned with the question of how promises could bind even 
in the best of circumstances, its focus is implicitly limited to cases 
where there is no question that a promise has been made, and no diffi-
culty in determining the exact content of the promised action ¢. That 
literature may still contribute, however, to the law's resolution of these 
issues. There are many possible ways of resolving questions of inter-
pretation or background rules, and at least two are perfectly consistent 
with many of the philosophical positions described above. The first 
involves a sociological inquiry into the actual practices and customs 
that exist in any particular community, as a guide to interpreting par-
ticular utterances and filling in appropriate background rules. The 
second involves an appeal to the deeper philosophical values used to 
justify the institution of promising - that is, values such as social 
utility or individual freedom or encouraging valuable relationships 
(depending on the theory of promising employed). Each of these will 
be discussed below. 
1. Existing Expectations 
The frequent references in the philosophical literature to the "prac-
tice" or "institution" of promising could be taken to suggest that the 
exact scope of any promissory obligation is a matter of sociological 
fact, to be discovered by careful investigation into the practice of 
40. For some famous instances of ambiguity in this respect, see United Steel Workers, Local 
1330 v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1, 5-6 (N.D. Ohio), ajfd. in part and vacated in 
part, 631F.2d1264 (6th Cir. 1980); Embry v. Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 127 Mo. 
App. 383, 387-92, 105 S.W. 777 (1907). 
41. For a more extended discussion of the similarities between interpretation and the selec-
tion of default rules, see Goetz & Scott, supra note 3, at 264-86. 
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promising as it exists in the relevant community.42 For instance, an 
inquiry into the use of promises in late twentieth-century America 
might show that promisors were regularly excused whenever perform-
ance became commercially impracticable, or it might show that 
promisors were never excused no matter how difficult performance 
had become. In either case, the results of that inquiry would define 
the exact scope of the obligation that any late twentieth-century 
American had accepted when she made a promise. 
Of course, any serious sociological inquiry would very likely iden-
tify several different forms of promising, each with different back-
ground rules and assumptions, even within a single community.43 At 
the very least, it would certainly be possible for a society to recognize 
several different kinds of promises, each with a different set of rules 
defining the exact scope of the obligation. For example, a society 
could have one kind of promise that imposes an absolute obligation to 
perform (in legal terms, one that exposes the promisor to a suit for 
"specific performance"), another that imposes an obligation to per-
form or to pay the equivalent in money ("expectation damages"), and 
a third that imposes an obligation to perform or to make good any 
losses the promisee may have suffered by relying on the promise ("reli-
ance damages"). The community could also use promises that impose 
an obligation to perform unless performance became extremely diffi-
cult in some unexpected way (in legal terms, promises subject to the 
defense of commercial impracticability), and promises that permit no 
such excuse. 
The possibility of more than one kind of promise greatly compli-
cates the difficulties involved in interpreting the sociological data 
about a society's practices. For example, obvious questions arise con-
cerning the number of people who must follow any set of rules for 
those rules to be accepted as a legally relevant practice. Must an insti-
tution be recognized in the community prior to its invocation in any 
particular transaction, or can any two parties create a custom-made 
form of promising on the spur of the moment?44 A related question 
involves the way we conceive of an individual who appears to be vio-
lating the rules of an existing practice: Is she merely an ordinary rule-
breaker, or a pathbreaking pioneer in the creation of a new, perhaps 
42. I use "sociological" here in its broadest possible sense, to include existing rules of con· 
tract law as well as any extra-legal or private promissory practices. 
43. As a number of authors have recognized-e.g .. J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATU-
RAL RIGHTS 308-10 (1980); Jones, supra note 16, at 296; Raz, Promises and Obligations, supra 
note 8, at 227-28. 
44. The latter position is suggested by Raz, Promises and Obligations, supra note 8, at 214-15. 
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more desirable form of promising? Other difficulties include the prob-
lem of conflicting expectations at different levels of generality - for 
example, if people expect written contracts to be binding, but they also 
expect goods to be sold at a fair price, what is their expectation regard-
ing the force of a written contract that sets an unfair price? And what 
of the potential for circularity that arises when people's expectations 
are themselves affected by existing legal rules?45 
These problems in inferring morally relevant categories from 
purely empirical data are well-known, so I will not pursue them here. 
Instead, for the remainder of this section I will assume that sociolo-
gists can identify the set of promises - call them promisei. promise2, 
... promisen - available to members of any particular society. How-
ever, this identification of the relevant choice set does not exhaust the 
possible uses of sociology. In order to reach a decision about any par-
ticular case, the courts must have some method of determining which 
kind of promise was actually made by the parties to any given 
transaction. 
One can imagine societies in which this second question would be 
easy to answer - e.g., societies with a system of formal devices by 
which individuals could signal their choice of institutions. For exam-
ple, the society might require all binding promises to be signed with a 
seal (ignoring for the moment the possibility of different kinds of bind-
ing promises), while treating any promises not made under seal as 
nonbinding. In such a society, the problem of interpreting the parties' 
utterances would deserve the lack of attention it received in the philo-
sophical writings about promises, for it would be, quite literally, noth-
ing but a formality. 
The difficulty, of course, is that most societies do not use this 
method of interpreting parties' utterances, and for good reason. Even 
when there are only two kinds of promises from which to choose, 
many writers have commented on the difficulties of expecting all lay 
people to understand the use of the seal, and the apparent harshness of 
enforcing one set of rules against parties who clearly intended a differ-
ent set to apply but who forgot to use the appropriate formality.46 
45. See, e.g., Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 837 
(1983) ("The law presumably is one factor shaping standards of social and especially commercial 
behavior. People's 'expectations' and merchants' notions of 'good faith' are to some extent de-
pendent on the positive, public expression of norms by contract law itself."). But see id. at 844-
45 ("Contemporary and historical research suggests that people generally don't know or don't 
care much about the rules of contract law and generally carry out their affairs with little regard 
for them."). 
46. See, e.g., Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1685, 1697 (1976). 
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These difficulties multiply rapidly if there are more than two kinds of 
promises - that is, more than two permissible sets of background 
rules - from which to choose. It would be very difficult to design a 
different seal for each of one hundred possible sets of promissory rules 
- and even more difficult to expect everybody to remember which 
seal they should use for each purpose. As a consequence, courts fol-
lowing this approach may have to appeal to sociology not only to iden-
tify the set of promises recognized in any particular society, but also to 
identify the more complex signals by which different kinds of promises 
are invoked. For example, a survey to determine what people usually 
mean when they say "I promise" or "I intend" might tell us what kind 
of commitment people usually have in mind when they make those 
noises - or, if the inquiry becomes more particularized, when they 
make those noises in particular contexts. Indeed, this is part of what 
courts do under current contract law when they inquire into the "rea-
sonable interpretation" of the parties' language.47 
Notice, though, that this kind of inquiry takes judges far beyond 
the "small number of basic moral principles" referred to in the intro-
duction to this article. If we must rely on sociological investigation to 
identify the set of possible background rules, and also to tell us which 
set of rules applies in any particular case, then sociology is doing virtu-
ally all of the work involved in fulfilling the needs of contract law. 
This alone is enough to defeat the claim referred to in the introduction 
that the philosophy of promising can by itself yield definite implica-
tions for the content of contract law. 
2. Substantive Moral Values 
A more serious objection to this total reliance on sociological data 
is that it provides no perspective from which to criticize existing prom-
issory practices, or to propose reforms in those practices. One might 
criticize particular legal rules for not properly conforming to those 
practices, but there would be no way to criticize the practices them-
selves. However, sociology is not the only possible source of content 
for contract law's background rules. An alternative is to look to the 
substantive values which justify the binding force of promises in the 
first place (according to one of the philosophical theories discussed 
earlier), to see if those values have implications for contract law's 
background rules. 
Economic analysis is the most familiar instance of this method of 
determining the content of contract law's background rules. From an 
47. But not the whole part - see infra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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economic perspective, if society is justified in giving individuals the 
power to make morally binding promises, it is because such promises 
will, under certain conditions, lead to the most efficient satisfaction of 
human wants. This notion of efficiency (or some variant of it) can 
then be used to choose among various possible background rules, by 
identifying the rule that would contribute most to efficiency. For ex-
ample, there is an extensive body of literature analyzing different con-
tract remedies to determine which remedies are most efficient in which 
situations.48 Economists have also addressed the question of the most 
efficient rule for excusing promisors who fail to perform because of 
unexpected difficulties in performance, 49 and the conditions under 
which individuals' promises should not be treated as binding because 
of "market failures" that distort the promisor's incentives. 50 
John Rawls provides another example of how background rules 
might be chosen in order best to serve the substantive values that jus-
tify the binding force of promises in the first place. Rawls argued that 
the binding force of promises is justified if and only if the rules of 
promising - the background rules, in the terminology used here -
are themselves consistent with principles of justice. For Rawls, this 
meant that they must lead to an equal distribution of all "primary 
48. For nontechnical introductions to this literature, see A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO LAW AND EcoNOMICS ch. 5 (1983); Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the 
Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 629 (1988); Kornhauser, An Introduction to the 
Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683 (1986). More technical 
analyses include Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1985); Craswen, Peiformance, Reliance, and One-Sided Information, 18 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 365 (1989); Craswen, Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Prob-
lem, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (1988); Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach 'of Co!ltract, 
26 J.L. & ECON. 691 (1983); Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 427 (1983); Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of 
Contract, 15 RAND J. EcoN. 39 (1984);' Shaven, The Design of Contracts and Remedies for 
Breach, 99 Q.J. EcoN. 121 (1984); Shaven, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. 
EcoN. 466 (1980). • 
49. See, e.g., Bruce, An Economic Analysis of the Impossibility Doctrine, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 
311 (1982); Goldberg, Impossibility and Related Excuses, 144 J. INST. & THEOR. ~ON. 100 
(1988); Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 119 (1977); Perloff, The Effects of Breaches of Forward Contracts Due to Unantici-
pated Price Changes, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 221 (1981); Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and 
Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977); Sykes, 
Increased Cost of Peiformance and the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability, 19 J. LEGAL 
STUD. (forthcoming Jan. 1990); White, Contract Breach and Contract Discharge Due to Impossi-
bility: A Unified Theory, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 353 (1988). 
50. E.g., Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1151 (1976); 
Ordover & Weiss, Information and the Law: Evaluating Legal Restrictions on Competitive Con-
tracts, 71 AM. EcoN. REv. PAPERS & PROC. 399 (1981); Rea, Arm-Breaking, Consumer Credit, 
and Personal Bankruptcy, 22 EcoN. INQUIRY 188 (1984); Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the 
Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985); Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in 
Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. 
REV. 630 (1979); Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. 
REV. 1053 (1977). 
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social goods" (liberty, wealth, etc.), except to the extent that an une-
qual distribution would benefit every member of society.s1 This pro-
vides a slightly different criterion for judging possible background 
rules - although one that will overlap with economic analysis when 
assessing the ways in which different rules benefit the contracting 
parties.s2 
Other writers have focused on other substantive values, which 
could lead them to different conclusions about the proper background 
rules. For example, John Finnis has argued that the binding force of 
promises is justified because of the way promises can solve coordina-
tion problems.s3 This enables him to endorse whatever background 
rules are most likely to serve this coordination goal. s4 Still another 
example can be found in Joseph Raz's suggestion that the binding 
force of promises is justified by the value of the special relationships 
which promises create. ss Though Raz does not develop this theory at 
any length, it might be possible to decide which of all possible relation-
ships were the most valuable and to adopt the background rules that 
best facilitated those relationships. For example, if relationships that 
can be terminated at will are less desirable than those that are more 
difficult to terminate, that might justify a background rule providing 
for a relatively large measure of damages for breach of contract. 
It is important to realize that the selection of background rules 
designed to promote the substantive values that justify making 
promises binding is not necessarily inconsistent with freedom of con-
tract. Under a strong version of this approach - that is, a version 
arguing that the selected background rules should be mandatory -
freedom of contract would indeed be restricted. s6 But this approach 
can also be used in a milder version, endorsing the preferred back-
51. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 344-48 (1971). The principles of justice themselves 
are discussed at more length in id. at 54-117. ' 
52. See id. at 67-83. 
53. J. FINNIS, supra note 43, at 298-308. See also the discussion of coordination problems in 
J. RAWLS, supra note 51, at 346-48. 
54. See J. FINNIS, supra note 43, at 320-25 (discussing whether contractual obligations 
should be viewed as giving the promisor a free election between performing and paying 
damages). 
55. See Raz, Promises and Obligations, supra note 8, at 227-28; see also supra note 23 and 
accompanying text. 
56. For various perspectives on arguments that might justify the strong version of one of 
these theories, see Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POLY. 
Autumn 1986, at 179; Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tori Law, 
With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Mo. L. REV. 
563 (1982); Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983); Radin, 
Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). See also the previously cited economics 
articles, supra note 50. 
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ground rules merely as default rules or methods of interpretation for 
those cases where the parties have not specified a preference for some 
other rule.57 Any system of law, however committed it may be to the 
idea of freedom of contract, must have some way of resolving those 
issues on which the parties' contract is silent cir ambiguous. A rebut-
table presumption in favor of the rule that best serves some substantive 
moral value is one way to resolve such cases. 
B. Unhelpful Substantive Values 
The preceding section argued that background rules could some-
times be derived from whatever substantive values justified the binding 
force ~f promises in the first place. However, only some of the philo-
sophical theories discussed in section l.B rest on substantive values 
that are of any help in selecting background rules. In this section, I 
argue that theories which justify the binding force of promises on the 
basis of the obligation to tell the truth, or on considerations of individ-
ual liberty and autonomy, are of no help at all in such an enterprise. 
Part III then documents this claim by examining writers who attempt 
to derive implications for contract law from theories based on individ-
ual autonomy or the obligation to tell the truth. 
1. Preventing Misrepresentation 
One of the philosophical theories discussed earlier held that 
promises derive their binding force from the fact that failing to carry 
out a promise would falsify the promise as a definite statement about 
the future, thereby violating the obligation to tell the truth. 58 Assume, 
for the moment, that this theory is sound. The question is what, if 
anything, it tells us about the proper background rules of contract law. 
With respect to the rules governing implied obligations, such as . 
implied warranties, the misrepresentation theory tells us very little. 
For example, suppose that someone says, "I promise to give you my 
car in exchange for $5000," and then delivers a car that doesn't run. 
The misrepresentation theory says that· if the speaker can properly be 
interpreted as saying "I will definitely give you my car, and it will be 
in good running condition," then the speaker's failure to· do so will 
make her statement false, thereby violating her obligation to tell the 
truth. On the other hand, the misrepresentation theory also says that 
57. See, e.g., Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 242, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (1921) 
("From the conclusion that promises may not be treated [as one of the parties had urged] with-
out a sacrifice of justice, the progress is a short one to the conclusion that they may not be so 
treated without a perversion of intention."). 
58. See supra section I.B.3. 
512 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:489 
if the speaker is ·more properly interpreted as saying "I will definitely 
give you my car, but I guarantee nothing about its condition," the 
speaker's failure to deliver a working car will not falsify her earlier 
statement. In other words, the misrepresentation theory leaves the 
proper outcome entirely dependent on the proper interpretation of the 
speaker's promise. 
There are, of course, any number of ways to resolve this inter-
pretation question. We could look to sociology to tell us how much 
responsibility most people expect sellers to assume under these cir-
cumstances. Alternatively, we could look to other substantive values 
to try to resolve the interpretation question. For example, if it is more 
efficient to put responsibility for such problems on the seller, or if rela-
tionships that continue over time are for some reason considered more 
desirable than relationships where each side's involvement ends as 
soon as the goods change hands, that might justify interpreting such 
statements as committing the seller to an implied warranty, at least in 
the absence of explicit statements to the contrary. 
Notice, though, that nothing about the misrepresentation theory 
tells us which method of interpretation we ought to use. The misrep-
resentation theory is consistent with interpreting promises in accord 
with whatever default rule most people already expect, or whatever 
default rule would be most efficient, or whatever default rule best 
serves some substantive value other than economic efficiency. While 
the misrepresentation theory of promising tells us that people must 
live up to the proper interpretation of their promise, it is equally con-
sistent with any of the ways in which the proper interpretation might 
be identified. 59 Thus, knowing that contracts should be enforced in 
order to prevent misrepresentation tells us nothing about which 
method of interpretation ought to be employed, or anything else rele-
vant to deciding whether there should be an implied warranty in this 
transaction. 
For similar reasons, the misrepresentation theory also tells us little 
about the background rules governing the proper remedy for nonper-
formance. If the speaker's promise is interpreted as saying, "I will 
definitely give you this car, rather than any substitute," then only the 
delivery of the actual car could avoid falsifying that statement, sug-
gesting that a remedy of specific performance would be most appropri-
ate. But other interpretations are also possible - for example, "I will 
give you this car, or else give you enough money to let you buy an-
59. For a more extensive discussion of this point, with reference to the law of false advertis-
ing, see Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657 (1985). 
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other car just like it." If this is the proper interpretation to place on 
the speaker's remarks, ordinary market-value damages would be 
enough to avoid falsifying her statement. Other interpretations are 
equally possible - e.g., " ... or else I'll return your purchase price," 
" ... or else I'll make good your reliance expenses," or even ". . . or 
else I'll pay you X dollars to make up for it," where X could be any 
number under the sun. 
It might be argued that the misrepresentation theory at least estab-
lishes that the seller's failure to deliver the car is wrong, and therefore 
deserves at least some sanction. That is, the misrepresentation theory 
might seem to point us"to punishment theory - to principles of deter-
rence or retribution, or arguments that the severity of the punishment 
ought to be proportional to the gravity of the offense - to determine 
the appropriate sanction for nonperformance. However, even this 
conclusion depends on an implicit resolution of the interpretation is-
sue discussed in the preceding paragraph. If the seller's statement is 
best interpreted in one of the ways discussed above - say, "I will 
definitely give you this car, or else I'll return your purchase price" -
then there is nothing wrong with the seller's failure to deliver the car, 
so long as she is at least willing to return the purchase price. Thus, if 
the quoted language represents the best interpretation of the seller's 
statement (according to some theory of what makes for the best inter-
pretation), the question of the proper remedy for nondelivery is settled 
without any need to appeal to punishment theory. To justify looking 
to punishment theory to determine the sanction, a misrepresentation 
theorist would first have to establish that the seller's remarks ought to 
be interpreted as something other than any of the quoted propositions 
suggested above. 
Admittedly, most promisers probably do not explicitly have in 
mind anything like those quoted propositions. 60 This may be why it 
seems inherently correct or natural to treat the question of an appro-
priate remedy as a question for punishment theory, rather than as a 
question of interpretation. If most promisors have in mind only some-
thing like "I will definitely give you this car," then that certainly could 
be interpreted as an agreement that it would be wrong for the seller to 
fail to tum over the car, thereby calling on punishment theory to de-
termine the appropriate response. At a minimum, it could be argued 
that such a construction ought to be adopted as the default rule, 
thereby shifting to any seller who wanted some other remedy the bur-
den of making a more explicit statement to the contrary. 
60. See o.w. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 237 (1963 ed.) ("when people make contracts, 
they usually contemplate the performance rather than the breach"). -
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My argument is simply that this construction - the construction 
that makes the appropriate sanction turn on some theory of punish-
ment - is not in any way entailed by the misrepresentation theory of 
promising. The value of telling the truth would in no way be compro-
mised by adopting any of the other constructions discussed above, 
thereby putting the burden of stating otherwise on sellers who object 
to the chosen construction. Thus, if there is any reason for preferring 
one possible construction over the others, that reason has to be some-
thing more than just the value of telling the truth. It must rest on 
some belief about what most people already expect, and some argu-
ment about why the law ought to fulfill existing expectations; or a 
belief about what default rule is most efficient, and some argument 
about why the law should be concerned with efficiency (to cite just two 
of the possibilities). In other words, the misrepresentation theory set-
tles none of the possible questions about what values the law ought to 
look to in selecting its background rules. 
2. Individual Autonomy 
Another view of promising justifies the moral force of a promise as 
a necessary corollary of individual liberty or autonomy. 61 If promises 
were not binding, it is argued, individual freedom would be unjustifi-
ably restricted, as individuals would be deprived of the freedom to 
place themselves under a moral obligation respecting their future con-
duct. While there may be a slight paradox in the notion that freedom 
must include the freedom to limit one's freedom in the future, advo-
cates of this theory resolve that paradox in favor of allowing individu-
als to make binding promises. 62 
Autonomy-based theories may well have implications for what I 
have called "agreement rules," or rules concerning the conditions 
under which individuals will be allowed to vary the background rules 
that would otherwise govern their relations. For example, these theo-
rists generally oppose the restrictions on freedom of contract repre-
sented by the rule denying enforceability to promises unsupported by 
consideration, or to promises that are deemed unconscionable. 63 More 
precisely, they oppose restrictions on the enforceability of promises 
unless true consent is lacking (e.g., cases of duress), or unless the sub-
61. E.g., C. FRIED, supra note 1. 
62. Id. at 14. But cf. 1 M. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE: A TREATISE ON 
EcONOMIC PRINCIPLES 153-55 (1962) (offering a libertarian argument that contracts for per-
sonal services should never be legally enforceable); see also infra note 64. 
63. C. FRIED, supra note l, at 28-39, 103-09; Barnett, supra note 21, at 313-14. 
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ject of the promise is not the promisor's to give away. 64 Thus, one 
necessary part of these theories is a specification of the conditions 
under which a party's apparent consent will be recognized as valid. 
As long as these conditions are satisfied, autonomy-based theories hold 
that any rule or obligation agreed to by the parties should be allowed 
to govern their relationship. 
In cases where the parties have not specified the rule they prefer, 
however, autonomy-based theories have much less to tell us. In these 
cases, autonomy-based theories run into the same problem as the mis-
representation theory. Just as any default rule would be consistent 
with the obligation to tell the truth, any default rule would also be 
consistent with individual freedom, as long as the parties are allowed 
to change the rule by appropriate language. Consequently, some other 
principle must be invoked to decide which of the many possible default 
rules to adopt. The rule could be chosen by looking to sociological 
data to determine which rule most parties already expect in various 
circumstances; it could also be chosen by appealing to some substan-
tive value such as economic efficiency, or Rawls' difference principle, 
or any other view about what makes some kinds of contractual rela-
tionships more valuable than others. Thus, even if those principles 
have been rejected as valid justifications for the binding force of 
promises, one or more of them must still be selected to provide the 
default rules for parties who have not unambiguously specified some 
other rule in their contract. 
The reason that misrepresentation and autonomy-based theories 
are unhelpful in the selection of default rules is that, of all the philo-
sophical theories discussed earlier in section I.B, these two share the 
characteristic of being completely content-neutral. 65 They give rea-
64. Cf. Barnett, supra note 56, at 185-95, 197 (arguing that individuals cannot alienate con-
trol over their persons, and thus have no right to provide for the remedy of specific performance 
in contracts for personal services). Barnett would, however, allow individuals to alienate the 
disjunctive right to "my personal services or their value in monetary damages, if I subsequently 
choose not to perform"; he thus would not render contracts for personal services completely 
unenforceable. Id. at 197. 
65. A similar concept, "content independence,'' is employed by Raz, Authority and Consent, 
supra note 8, at 114-16 (discussing examples of content-independent reasons for action or belief, 
including promises); see also J. R.Az, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra note 8, at 70 
("[B]oth [decisions and promises] are content-independent reasons: regardless what you promise 
or decide to do you have a reason to do it because you have promised or decided."). 
Raz argued that theories describing the way in which promises constrain a promiser's subse-
quent deliberations - that is, theories of the sort discussed earlier in section I.A - had to be 
content-neutral, or else they could not explain the constraint generated by the promise, as op-
posed to constraints that might argue in favor of doing ¢ even if no promise had ever been made. 
However, Raz in no way suggested that theories explaining the moral force of those constraints 
(theories of the sort discussed supra in section I.B) had to be neutral or indifferent with respect to 
the content of¢. If anything, his suggestions about the special value of certain kinds of relation-
ships suggest the contrary. Raz, Promises and Obligations, supra note 8, at 228. 
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sons why an individual who has promised to do ¢ thereby incurs some 
form of obligation to do ¢, regardless of how ¢ is filled in. The reason 
for this neutrality is understandable: To do anything more requires a 
theory that would tell people what kinds of promises they ought to 
make. Unfortunately, the theorists' reluctance to advise individuals as 
to how they ought to exercise their freedom to fill in the content of ¢ 
leaves them equally unable to give legal systems any guidance about 
how to fill in the content of ¢ when contracting parties fail to specify 
their preferred content. As a result, these two theories have nothing to 
contribute to the selection of default rules governing such important 
topics as implied terms and conditions, excuses, and remedies for 
breach. 
I should stress that this shortcoming in no way undercuts whatever 
validity these misrepresentation or autonomy-based theories may have 
in their original capacity, as justifications for the morally binding force 
of promises. It simply means that if one of these theories is accepted 
as the justification for the force of promises, some other theory or the-
ories must then be added to provide a basis for selecting appropriate 
background rules. This other theory must be a theory that is not neu-
tral between the different ways of filling in the exact scope of the par-
ties' obligation - for example, it must provide some reason for 
preferring promises with an implied warranty to promises without an 
implied warranty, or vice versa. In other words, this other theory 
must rely on more than the value of individual autonomy or the value 
of telling the truth. 
III. Two EXAMPLES 
Part II demonstrated that even if one accepts any of the misrepre-
sentation or autonomy-based theories as justifications for the moral 
force of promises, there are still important choices to be made con-
cerning the values used to select the law's background rules. Unfortu-
nately, these choices usually receive much less attention from those 
who write about contract law from the standpoint of misrepresenta-
tion or autonomy-based theories. As a result, those authors often end 
up defending their choice of default rules on an indefensibly ad hoc 
basis. At other times, they are led to oppose certain default rules un-
necessarily, simply because those default rules are supported by cer-
tain values that were rivals to the misrepresentation or autonomy-
based theory at the level of a justification for the moral force of 
promises. The final part of this article illustrates the difficulties that 
such theorists encounter by considering the theories of Charles Fried 
and Randy Barnett. These two authors have provided the most care-
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ful and comprehensive of recent attempts to give contract law a solid 
philosophical grounding. In addition, each rests his theory of why 
promises are binding on some version of the value of individual free-
dom or the obligation to tell the truth. 
A. Charles Fried 
As noted earlier, Fried justifies the obligation to keep a promise 
primarily by viewing it as a necessary corollary of individual auton-
omy. "If we decline to take seriously the assumption of an obligation 
... , to that extent we do not take [the promisor] seriously as a per-
son."66 To be sure, Fried is somewhat ambiguous on this point, for he 
also emphasizes the injury done to the promisee by the breaking of a 
promise. For example, he argues that promise-breaking abuses the 
promisee's trust in the promise, thereby violating the Kantian injunc-
tion against treating other people as means rather than as ends. 67 This 
moves Fried much closer to the misrepresentation theorists: as Fried 
himself puts it, promise-breaking "is like (but only like) lying."68 But 
since the autonomy-based and misrepresentation theories are equally 
unhelpful when it comes to the selection of default rules, an exact clas-
sification of Fried's position as between these two theories is unneces-
sary to my analysis. 
1. Expectation Damages 
On the question of the appropriate remedy for breach, Fried sup-
ports the expectation measure of damages, which is designed to give 
the promisee the same benefits he would have received had the prom-
ise been kept. According to Fried, "[i]f I make a promise to you, I 
should do as I promise; and if I fail to keep my promise, it is fair that I 
should be made to hand over the equivalent of the promised 
performance. "69 
A moment's consideration, however, will show that this conclusion 
cannot be derived solely from the value of individual freedom and au-
tonomy. Fried may well be correct that, in order to give free rein to an 
66. C. FRIED, supra note 1, at 20-21. 
67. Id. at 16. I am indebted to John Gardner for pointing out this ambiguity in Fried's 
position. 
68. Id. Fried refuses to join the misrepresentation theorists entirely because he interprets the 
obligation to tell the truth as an obligation not to lie knowingly, thereby imposing no restriction 
at all on a promiser who at the time of her promise intended to keep the promise. Id. at 17. 
Under the broader version of that obligation endorsed by most misrepresentation theorists, the 
difference between their theory and Fried's would become very small. See supra note 35 and 
accompanying text. · 
69. C. FRIED, supra note 1, at 17. 
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individual's autonomy, "[i]t is necessary that I be able to make non-
optional a course of conduct that would otherwise be optional for 
me."70 But almost any remedy - reliance damages, punitive dam-
ages, specific performance, etc. - makes the promised course of con-
duct non-optional to some degree, depending on the severity of the 
threatened penalty. There is surely nothing in the idea of individual 
autonomy that requires the exact degree of non-optionality provided 
by the expectation measure. The idea of individual autonomy does 
suggest that individuals should be allowed to make their conduct 
nonoptional to any extent they choose, by specifying one of these rem-
edies in their contract. But the law must still select one of these reme-
dies as the default rule, and nothing in the notion of individual 
autonomy gives any reason for favoring the expectation measure over 
any of the otherl). 71 
Fried might, of course, have some other value in mind which ex-
plains why the expectation measure is to be preferred (unless the par-
ties specify otherwise) over any of the other possible measures. For 
'example, Fried might believe that the expectation measure promotes 
economic efficiency, or better satisfies Rawls' difference principle, or 
would better solve most coordination problems. However, no such ar-
gument is made anywhere in his book. 
Alternatively, Fried might be appealing to data about people's ex-
isting beliefs to justify his preference for the expectation measure. He 
cannot be relying on existing nonlegal practices, for studies of those 
practices show that people often do not demand (or offer) expectation 
damages in cases of unexcused nonperformance. 72 However, Fried 
might be taking existing legal practices as his normative benchmark, 
for Anglo-American law often does employ the expectation measure of 
damages. That is, Fried's argument might be that because the law 
adopts liability for expectation damages as one incident of the obliga-
tion of promising, anyone who promises thereby accepts that liability 
as one of the rules of the game. If this is Fried's argument, though, his 
theory cannot be what justifies the law's choice of the expectation mea-
sure. The same argument would work equally well to explain why an 
individual was obliged to respect any other damage rule the law hap-
pened to have adopted. 
70. Id. at 13. 
71. For similar criticisms of Fried's autonomy-based argument for expectation damages, see 
Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 105, 106-08 (1989); Farber, Book Review, 66 MINN. L. REV. 561, 564-65 (1982). 
72. E.g., Epstein, supra note 71, at 112-21; Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: 
A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963). 
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Fried's only other argument in favor of the expectation measure is 
really an argument against one of the possible alternatives, the reliance 
measure of damages. When addressing the possible justifications for 
the binding force of promises, Fried argues against the theory that 
promises are binding only because promise-breaking would injure 
those who relied on the promise. Fried goes on, however, to treat his 
argument against that justification for the binding force of promises as 
also being an argument against adopting the reliance measure of dam-
ages as a default rule. 73 That is,. he seems to assume that the reliance 
measure of damages could only be justified as a default rule if one first 
accepted the promisee's reliance as an explanation for the binding 
force of a promise. 
If this is Fried's argument, it rests on a non sequitur. Granted, one 
way of arguing for the reliance measure of damages would be to argue 
that the reason promises are binding is because promise-breaking in-
jures those who rely on the promise. However, it hardly follows that 
this is the only way that the reliance measure of damages can be sup-
ported, or that rejection of the reliance justification for the binding 
force of promises also entails rejection of the reliance measure of dam-
ages. This error becomes even more obvious when it is recalled that 
we are considering the reliance measure of damages as a default rule, 
which would still leave the parties free to specify the expectation mea-
sure (or any other measure of damages) in its place. Adopting the 
reliance measure merely as a default rule is in some ways inconsistent 
with the theory that promises are binding only in order to prevent 
reliance losses, for a default rule lets the parties agree to other damage 
rules which would effectively make their promise binding even in the 
absence of any reliance losses. The notion of reliance damages as a 
default rule seems much more compatible with the views of someone 
like Fried, who believes that the binding force of promises derives en-
tirely from the freedom of the individual promisers. 
In a nutshell, then, the difficulty with Fried's position on expecta-
tion damages is the difficulty identified earlier in Part II of this article. 
Any damage measure is consistent with the ideal of individual auton-
omy, as long as it is adopted solely as a default rule, since any default 
rule expands the promiser's options by making it easier for her to 
make a certain kind of promise. Fried must therefore invoke some 
other value in order to decide which of the many damage rules to 
select as a starting point. Moreover, that value will necessarily be one 
which Fried rejected as a possible justification for the binding force of 
73. C. FRIED, supra note 1, at 18-19. 
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promises, for the only value serving that role for Fried - the value of 
individual autonomy - is equally consistent with all default rules. To 
choose a default rule, then, Fried has to let one of the other values 
back into the analysis, and the only question is which one. 
2. Rescission 
Fried encounters a similar problem when he addresses the question 
of whether a promisee's only remedy for nonperformance is to sue for 
expectation damages, or whether the promisee should also have the 
option of rescinding the contract and recovering any advance pay-
ments. Such an option could be extremely important to the promisee 
if, for example, the market price of the promised goods had fallen 
since the time of the contract. In such a case, the promisee would 
much prefer to get his money back and buy the goods elsewhere (at 
their new, lower price), rather than merely being allowed to recover 
from the promisor the market value of any goods that were defective 
or were not delivered. 
Fried initially seems to regard the promisee's right to rescind the 
contract as being a natural corollary of the binding force of promising. 
"Parties bind themselves reciprocally. If one party treats himself as 
not bound, the other may also treat himself as not bound. By breaking 
his contract, a contractual partner not only opens himself up to claims 
for damages but releases his opposite number."74 This argument, 
though, is subject to the same objections as Fried's argument about the 
expectation measure. While a system of promising with that default 
rule would certainly expand a promisor's freedom, so too would an 
institution of promising with any other rule as its default rule. The 
quoted passage merely asserts that our system of promising contains 
rescission as one of its default remedies, without doing anything to 
justify that rule. 
Interestmgly, in this case Fried anticipates this very criticism. 
That is, he acknowledges that it is possible for contracting parties to 
provide either (a) that nonperformance by one party releases the other 
party from the contract (in legal terms, making the promises condi-
tional) or' (b) that nonperformance by one patty does not release the 
other party from the contract, but only exposes the first party to a suit 
for damages (in legal terms, making the promises indepertdent). He 
also notes that such provisions need not be explicitly stated to be effec-
tive. 75 In other words, Fried recognizes that there are (at least?) two 
74. Id. at 117. 
75. Id. at 118-23. 
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possible damage rules which parties should. be free to invoke, and that 
the law must somehow decide which rule to treat as invoked in any 
particular case. As he puts it much .earlier in the book, "does your 
breaking your promise cancel my reciproca1 obligation to you or just 
give me a remedy for my disappointment? There is no obvious a priori 
reason for one or the other response."76 .,_ 
In this case, Fried resolves the dilemma by an explicit appea1 to 
existing expectations, which he reads as supporting a default rule that 
includes the remedy of rescission. In his words, "[a]I].y other outcome 
would disturb the expectations on which contractua1 terms are usually 
established. " 77 Unfortunately, Fried says nothing to explain why the 
expectations of most people in the community should necessarily be 
dispositive in any individua1 case. Indeed, at other points in his analy-
sis Fried seems to view the enforcement of community expectations as 
somehow inconsistent with promissory principle8, belonging more to 
the realm of tort. 78 The problem, of course, is that Fried has to look 
to some outside value to decide whether rescission ought to be ac-
cepted as a norma1 default remedy. In this instance, he "solves'~ that 
problem simply by asserting that community expectations ought to 
govern the matter, without attempting any defense of that position. 
3. Other Default Rules 
Similar difficulties resurface when· Fried turns to the rules gov-
erning ex(?use for impracticability, frustration, or m_istake. However, 
Fried takes a somewhat different approach to the selection of the ap-
propriate default rules for these subjects. Fried sees these rules as nec-
essary to fill the "gaps" in the parties' agreement concerning problems 
which in some sense were unexpected, and for which neither party had 
agreed to assume responsibility. Because these rules relate to issues 
outside the scope of the parties' agreement, Fried argues that their 
justification need not rest on. his theory of promises as exercises of 
individual autonomy. Instead, Fried views these rules as justified by 
nonpromissory principles such as fault (responsibility for negligently 
inflicted losses), or what he calls altruism (sharing among members of 
76. Id. at 46 n.*. 
77. Id. at 118 (emphasis added). Fried cites no sociological data to support this claim: 
78. Cf. id. at 4: 
Now tort Jaw typically deals with involuntary transactions - if a punch in the nose, a traffic 
accident, or a malicious piece of gossip may be called a transaction -.,-- so that the role of the 
community in adjudicating the conflict is particularly prominent. . . . In contrast, so Jong as 
we see contractual obligation as based on promise, on obligations that the parties have them-
selves assumed, the focus of the inquiry is on the will of the parties. 
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a community).79 In this context, then, Fried clearly recognizes that he 
must appeal to substantive, non-content-neutral values. 
Fried also believes that many of the rules governing contract for-
mation must depend on values other than individual autonomy. Ex-
amples include the common law's "mailbox rule," which provides that 
an offer· cannot be revoked after an acceptance has been posted by the 
offeree; or the rule that an offer is deemed to lapse (and cannot later be 
accepted) if it has once been rejected by the offeree. In this area, Fried 
explicitly recognizes that any number of different default rules are con-
sistent with his theory of promises, and that the offeror should be per-
mitted to specify in her offer whatever rules she wants to apply.80 
Indeed, on the question of which default rule to adopt, he states that 
"there are no reasons in principle, nothing entailed by the concepts 
themselves, only considerations of fairness and convenience."81 In an-
alyzing particular rules, he usually takes the position that the most 
sensible default rule would be whichever one most offerors would pre-
fer, for that rule saves a majority of offerors the trouble of having to 
specify a different rule. He then embarks on an analysis of the costs 
and benefits of each rule to try to determine which rule most offerors 
would prefer. az 
In each of these areas, then, Fried is perfectly willing to appeal to 
some non-content-neutral value such as "fairness and convenience," 
even though those may not be the values which justify the binding 
force of promises. Once again, though, Fried never explains why he 
chooses the particular values he does. For example, why do the rules 
governing contract formation rest on arguments of "convenience" 
about the rule that most promisors would prefer, while the rules gov-
erning impracticability and mistake rests on principles of "fairness" 
such as equal sharing? The rules governing impracticability and mis-
take are always subject to variation by the parties' agreement, so the 
argument that the law should adopt whatever rule most parties would 
prefer (in order to save them the trouble of specifying otherwise) 
would seem just as strong when applied to those issues. Alternatively, 
if considerations of fairness trump the convenience of the promisor in 
contracts involving unanticipated risks, why should they not also 
79. Id. at ch. 5; see also id. at ch. 6 (taking a similar approach to the implied obligation of 
"good faith"). For criticisms of this aspect of Fried's theory, see Aliyah, Book Review, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 509, 520-23 (1981), and Reiter, Good Faith in Contracts, 17 VAL. U. L. REV. 
705, 719-23 (1983). 
80. C. FRIED, supra note l, at 47-51. 
81. Id. at 49. 
82. See id. at 49 n. * (discussing the rule that an offer lapses once it is rejected by the offeree); 
id. at 52 (discussing the mailbox rule). 
December 1989] The Philosophy of Promising 523 
trump the convenience of offerers in cases of offers that are delayed in 
the mail? Without any explicit theory explaining when each of these 
different values is an appropriate guide, Fried's appeal to different val-
ues in different contexts looks more like an ex post rationalization of 
the rules of contract law than a philosophical justification of those 
rules. 
Fried is also on weak ground in explaining his willingness in the 
areas of impracticability and mistake to make an explicit appeal to 
values other than individual autonomy, when he was unwilling to al-
low such appeals in considering the expectation measure of damages. 
Fried's only justification for looking beyond considerations of individ-
ual autonomy when deciding on the rules governing impracticability 
and mistake is his belief that most parties do not consciously consider 
the rules they wish to apply to such unexpected contingencies, so en-
forcing any particular rule can only be justified as a form of involun-
tary liability. 83 The same is true, however, of parties who make 
promises without consciously considering what remedies would be 
available if the promiser fails to perform without an acceptable ex-
cuse. 84 If values other than individual freedom and autonomy can be 
invoked to set the default rules governing impracticability and mis-
take, it is hard to see why they cannot also be invoked to set the de-
fault rules governing remedies for nonperformance. 
When all is said and done, then, Fried's theory about what justifies 
the binding force of promises - the theory which derives promises' 
force from considerations of individual freedom and autonomy -
plays very little role in his derivation of any of the relevant default 
rules. Unfortunately, Fried's preoccupation with his theory of promis-
ing seems to prevent him from developing a coherent theory of the 
values that should play a role in selecting default rules. Sometimes 
Fried relies on people's existing expectations; sometimes he uses eco-
nomic arguments; sometimes he rests on principles of "fault" or "al-
truism"; and sometimes, as in the case of expectation damages, he 
advances no justification at all. Such a scattershot approach to the 
selection of default rules does little to advance our understanding of 
contract law. 
B. Randy E. Barnett 
As noted earlier, Barnett views promises as transferring to the 
83. Id. at 60. 
84. See supra note 60. A similar point has been made by Atiyah, Misrepresentation, War-
ranty, and Estoppel, 9 ALBERTA L. REV. 347, 353 (i971). 
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promisee the promisor's property right in the promised good or ser- · 
vice. He therefore treats the obligation to carry out a promise as a 
specific instance of the more general obligation to respect property 
rights. 85 While this explanation of the binding force of promises dif-
fers froni Fried's in some respects, Fried and Barnett are actually very 
close on the underlying question of why anyone is obliged to respect 
property rights (in Barnett's case) or promises (in Fried's). Just as 
Fried defended the obligation to keep a promise on the ground that the 
power to make binding promises is a necessary corollary of individual 
liberty, Barnett sees the power to make binding transfers of property 
as justifiable on essentially libertarian grounds. 86 
Unlike Fried, however, Barnett does not view the obligation to 
carry out one's promise as binding only when the promisor truly and 
subjectively agrees to undertake that obligation. Barnett argues that 
any workable system of property rights must make use of clear signals 
of entitlement - boundary markers and title recordation in the case of 
real estate; objective manifestations of consent in the case of contracts 
- in order to give maximal guidance to those who need to know what 
their rights are. 87 Thus, in Barnett's view it is not inconsistent with 
individual liberty to hold individuals liable whenever they manifest 
their consent to an obligation, even if they subjectively intended to 
consent to no such thing. According to Barnett, a contrary rule would 
be inconsistent with the equal liberty of others, who may need to know 
whether the individual is subject to an obligation or not. 88 
Thus, an important operational difference between Barnett and 
Fried lies in Barnett's willingness to endorse the objective theory of 
interpretation as applied to contract law. 89 This frees Barnett from at 
least one of the difficulties faced by Fried. Fried believed that any 
background rules·pertaining to promissory matters could rest only on 
85. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
86. Barnett, supra. note 21, at 297-99. At least, if one asks why individuals should have the 
authority to decide whether and when to transfer away their property rights, Barnett's answer is 
libertarian: Such a right is the best way of "facilitating freedom of human action .•.. " Id. at 
297. If one asks why freedom of action is itself a desirable thing, his answer sounds closer to 
economic or utilitarian notions of preference-satisfaction: Liberty is the best way of facilitating 
individuals' "pursuit of survival and happiness." Barnett, Pursuing Justice in a Free Society: 
Part I - Power v. Liberty, 4 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 50, 57 (Summer/Fall 1985). Barnett differs 
from most economists, however, in his willingness ~o endorse a particular "vision of the good life 
for men," rather than relying solely on empirical observations about what people happen to 
prefer. Id. at 71 n.49. Since freedom itself is the only aspect of Barnett's vision of the good life 
that he invokes in his writings abput contract law, it seems appropriate to describe his position as 
resting ultimately on the value of individual freedom. 
87. Barnett, supra note 21, at 301-07. 
88. Id. at 305-06. 
89. Id. at 300-09; cf. C. FRIED, supra note 1, at 61-67 (criticizing the objective theory of 
interpretation as inconsistent with individual liberty). 
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the value of individual autonomy; he therefore had to exclude large 
areas of contract law (e.g., mistake, impracticability, and offer and ac-
ceptance) from the promissory sphere, in order to accept. default rules 
in those areas which were based on other values.90 Barnett faces.no 
such obstacle to the acceptance of default rules based on other values, 
for an "objective" interpretation of any given promise will necessarily 
depend on factors other than the promisor's subjective act of will. 
However, Barnett still faces the task of figuring out just which val-
ues should inform the objective interpretation of any particular action 
or agreement. Under Barnett's view of promises as marking consent 
to the transfer of property rights, the rules governing each party's obli-
gations can be described by specifying exactly which rights have been 
transferred. To use one of Barnett's examples, if a person who agrees 
to a sale of a car is best viewed as making an unconditional transfer of 
the right to that car, the buyer would be entitled to specific perform-
ance if the seller fails to hand over the property. If the seller is instead 
viewed as making a conditional transfer of the right to the car or the 
right to damag~ for nonperformance, the buyer could not sue for 'spe-
cific performance, but only for monetary damages.91 As Barnett puts 
it elsewhere, "[m]ost 'real world' contractual disputes involv.e deter-
mining precisely which rights were intended. to be transferred by the 
parties."92 While this passage could be read as referring to the actual, 
subjective intentions of the parties, his other writing makes it clear 
that the only relevant intentions are those indicated by all the objective 
markers of consent. 93 
Unfortunately, Barnett does not tell us how to decide which rights 
we should deem transferred by any particular set of objec~ive indica-
tors. In some cases, he looks solely to existing expectations about the 
obligations' normally assumed by parties in similar circumstances. For 
example, Barnett would usually resolve the issue discussed in the pre-
ceding paragraph in favor of the specific performance remedy, treating 
the parties as agreeing to an absolute transfer of rights (unless the con-
tract specifies otherwise). His principal rationale for this result is that 
"most people would expect that when the contract is executed [the 
buyer] has a right to the specified land or car.'~94 
90. See supra notes· 79-84 and accompanying text. 
· 91. Barnett, supra note 56, at 195-96. 
92. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law with Contract Theory, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 
1969, 1979 (1987). . 
93. Barnett, supra note 21, at 301-07,, 
94. Barnett, supra note 56, at 195. But cf. infra note 95. Barnett also argues that his pre-
ferred rule would properly place the burden of arguing against specific performance on the guilty 
breacher, rather than on the innocent plaintiff. See Barnett, supra note 56, at 182. However,' this 
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At other times, Barnett relies on economic arguments about the 
efficiency of various rules. For example, he suggests that his presump-
tion in favor of specific performance might be reversed in cases where 
specific performance would be extremely difficult for the seller and a 
fungibl~ replacement good is easily available to the buyer. 95 On an-
other topic, he argues that an employer who hires an employee but 
then dismisses him before the job has even begun should normally be 
treated as having assumed responsibility for any reliance losses the em-
ployee suffers - for example, if the employee has given up his prior 
job or incurred significant moving expenses. Barnett's rationale is a 
straightforward economic one: employers usually have better infor-
mation about the risk that the employee will not be needed, so employ-
ers will usually be the better risk bearer.96 At other times, though, 
Barnett seems to view his theory as not requiring any explicit recourse 
to economic analysis. For example, he asserts that even if his consent 
theory is consistent with the dictates of economic efficiency, it is still 
superior because its outcomes can often be determined "without 
resorting to an explicit efficiency analysis."97 
Even more troubling, on other occasions Barnett (like Fried) seems 
to believe that certain default rules are somehow inherent in the con-
cepts employed by his theory and therefore do not require normative 
justification of any sort. As an example, consider Barnett's analysis of 
the undisclosed agency problem which arises when an agent A buys 
goods from a third party T and turns them over to his undisclosed 
principal UP, whereupon UP gives A money to pay T for the goods, 
but A becomes insolvent and T never receives his payment.98 Barnett 
concludes that T can sue UP to collect his payment, even though this 
will make UP pay twice, once to the now-insolvent A and once to T. 
Barnett's argument is that the agency agreement between UP and A 
authorized A to transfer to T any of UP's rights. Once A entered into 
the purchase agreement with T, then, the transfer to T of UP's owner-
argument is clearly incorrect, for we cannot decide whether the seller is guilty of a breach until 
after we decide how to interpret the transaction. If the transaction is best interpreted as transfer· 
ring the right to the specified good or to its equivalent in monetary damages, there is nothing 
"guilty" in the seller paying monetary damages instead of handing over the good. 
95. Barnett, supra note 56, at 196 n.59 ("Where these circumstances can be shown to exist ••• 
it may no longer be safe to presume that sellers would have consented to specific relief."). Bar-
nett would also refuse to allow specific performance in contracts for personal services. See supra 
note 64 and accompanying text. But this is because he believes people should not have the 
authority to limit their future freedom to this extent. 
96. Barnett & Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and Mis-
representations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REv. 443, 478-80 (1987). 
97. Barnett, supra note 92, at 1976. 
98. Id. at 1984. 
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ship of the purchase price became an accomplished fact, and UP 
therefore had no right to resist T's demand for payment.99 
While this description of the transaction may be consistent with 
the rules of agency law, it in no way justifies or explains those rules. 
The problem is that Barnett never justifies his construction of the un-
derlying agency agreement between UP and A, which he reads as em-
powering A to make an unconditional transfer of UP's rights. At least 
as a matter of logic, that agency agreement could equally well be inter-
preted as giving A the more limited power to make a conditional trans-
fer of UP's rights (conditional on A's not becoming insolvent), thereby 
putting the risk of A's insolvency on T rather than on UP. Either 
arrangement is perfectly consistent with the principle of giving fair 
notice to T, as long as the legal rule is clear in advance so that T 
knows the degree of risk he is being asked to assume. To put the same 
point slightly differently, either rule would represent a perfectly "ob-
jective" interpretation of the agreement. To argue for one rule over 
the other, Barnett would have to point to some other reason - effi-
ciency, existing expectations, etc. - to explain why it was better to 
put the risk of A's insolvency on UP rather than on T, at least as a 
presumptive matter. He would thep. have to explain why the reason he 
selected (efficiency, or whatever) was the appropriate principle to look 
to in selecting a default rule. 
In discussing a more complex problem .of undisclosed agency law, 
Barnett does suggest an awareness of some of these difficulties. In a 
footnote, he states: 
Developing a consent theory's approach to construing contractual intent 
when parties are silent on an issue would require a lengthy and separate 
treatment. Such an effort would involve, among other topics: (1) a dis-
cussion of tacit versus expressed knowledge; (2) the presumption that the 
parties intended what most similarly situated parties would have in-
tended ex ante, thus putting the onus on a minority of parties to express 
their dissent from the majority by an express term; and (3) the likely 
incentive effects of the. principles of construction on the bargaining be-
havior of other parties. 100 
Other topics for discussion could easily be added to this list - for 
example, (4) the conditions under which transaction costs make it dif-
ficult for parties to vary the default rule by an express term to the 
contrary, and (5) the principle that ought to be used to select the de-
fault rule in those cases where whatever rule the law selects is_ likely to 
99. Id. at 1984-85. 
100. Id. at 1986 n.71. 
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remain in force for most parties.101 
What Barnett does not seem to realize, however, is how little can 
be accomplished with respect to the content of the law's background 
rules until this "lengthy and separate treatment" has been completed. 
Without a theory of interpretation, the only guidance we are left with 
in selecting default rules is that the law should take an objective ap-
proach to interpretation. But to endorse an objective approach is 
merely to identify one factor - the secret, subjective intention of 
either party - which should not be used as a reason for preferring one 
rule over another. It says nothing about which factors should be con-
sidered. It thus leaves unresolved all the debates concerning the role 
of efficiency as a goal of contract law, or the extent to which contract 
law should be shaped by redistributional concerns or other values. 
Barnett may have rejected those values as inadequate explanations for 
the binding force of promises, but their role in the selection of default 
rules remains completely open. 
CONCLUSION 
Debates over the question of why promises are binding will no 
doubt continue to occupy the attention of philosophers and legal 
scholars. Such debates raise issues that are fundamental to western 
political thought - issues such as individual freedom versus collective 
control, economic efficiency versus non-economic values, or (more 
generally) consequentialist systems of ethics versus deontological ones. 
Any question that offers such a tempting array of topics will always be 
the subject of frequent visits by scholars, and the question of why 
promises are binding is no exception. 
My thesis is that debates over the question of why promises are 
binding do much less than is commonly supposed to settle the role to 
be played by efficiency, non-economic values, or ethical theories gener-
ally in selecting contract law's background rules. More precisely, I 
have argued that certain answers to the question of why promises are 
binding do nothing to settle these larger issues. Theories that explain 
the binding force of promises by pointing to the value of individual 
freedom, or the obligation to tell the truth, may well be valid answers 
to the question of why promises are binding. But truth and freedom 
can usually be served equally well by any background rule, so some 
other value must be introduced to explain why any one rule ought to 
be chosen over any other. And when we ask which values ought to be 
101. For a discussion of these issues from an economic perspective, see the articles cited 
supra in note 3. 
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introduced for this purpose, we thereby reopen the entire debate about 
the role of efficiency, non-economic values, and other ethical theories. 
Even if we have rejected any particular value as an explanation of why 
promises are binding in the first place, that does not settle the question 
of whether that value can or should be used in selecting a default rule. 
In short, much of the current philosophical debate about the bind-
ing force of promises is simply irrelevant to contract law's choice of 
background rules. Legal philosophers who are interested in the con-
tent of contract law should direct their energies to this question, and 
not solely to the question of why promises ought to be binding. 
